# 1AC vs. Kansas KS - NDT

### Advantage 1 is Intervention

#### Obama has installed Responsibility to Protect at the core of intervention strategy

Vigeant 13 (Matthew E., J.D. 2015, Columbia Law School; M.P.A. 2015, Harvard Kennedy School, “Unforeseen Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for Congressional and Judicial Involvement”, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, online)

Under the Obama Administration, however, R2P has become a component of U.S. foreign policy. The first U.S. government action that brought R2P into the wheelhouse of American foreign policy came just prior to the 2008 elections. The Genocide Prevention Task Force – an organization jointly convened by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the u.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the American Academy of Diplomacy – “urge[d] America’s 44th president to demonstrate at the outset that preventing genocide and mass atrocities is a national priority.”23 The Task Force also suggested that the next President “develop and promulgate a government-wide policy on preventing genocide and mass atrocities… create a standing interagency mechanism for analysis of threats and consideration of appropriate action…[and] strengthen global efforts to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.”24 The Obama Administration seized on the Task Force’s recommendations, and translated them into a broader elevation of R2P as a national security interest, via three key documents. First Presidential Study Directive 10 (“PSD-10”) on Mass Atrocities declares mass atrocity prevention to be a “core national security interest and core moral responsibility.”25 PSD-10 directed the establishment of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board (“APB”), made up of government officials across multiple federal agencies and tasked the APB to meet regularly to identify and address atrocity threats.26 The APB is also ordered to “consider the recommendations of relevant bipartisan and expert studies, including the recommendations of the bipartisan Genocide Prevention Task Force” in developing U.S. policy.27 The APB first met on April 23, 2012, and its first Director was Samantha Power, now the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., who once wrote that America had a “duty to act” to prevent any foreign genocide.28 The second document is the 2010 National Security Strategy (“NSS”). The NSS states that “[t]he United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect.”29 The NSS continues that “[i]n the event that prevention fails, the United States will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and – in certain instances – military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.”30 The inclusion of R2P in the National Security Strategy is seen by the international community as a signal from the Obama Administration that embracing R2P is in the national interest of the U.S.31 Third, the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (“MARO”) Project, a joint project between Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and the U.S. Army War College, has “developed a conceptual framework for MARO, explaining the underlying common elements and unique challenges of a MARO compared to other types of military operations.”32 The outcome of the Project is the MARO Handbook, which senior Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Council, and other Administration Officials have utilized in table-top exercise simulations.33 Following publication of the MARO handbook, mass atrocity response was incorporated into Army Training and Doctrine Command publications, and the 2010 Department of Defense Quadrennial Review. In addition to these documents and actions, the President and members of his administration have made public pronouncements supporting the concept of R2P multiple times. President Obama’s 2009 Nobel Peace Prize Address discussed the role that militaries can play to protect vulnerable populations. Later, the President stated that “I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds…. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That’s why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.” 36 In 2009, then-U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice stated that the U.S. took its responsibility to protect civilians from violations of international law “seriously.”37 Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Shapiro labeled “the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core national security interest of the United States.”38 And on April 23, 2012, President Obama said that “national sovereignty is never a license to slaughter you own people,” as he discussed the creating of the APB.39 These public comments are only a small sampling of public Obama Administration support for R2P. Additionally, the placement of R2P proponents, such as Susan Rice and Samantha Power in senior U.S. defense and foreign relations posts signals the President’s support for the doctrine.40 Under the Obama Administration, the concept of R2P has become a core national interest. This interest was given as one of the reasons for the Libyan intervention, but is this a legally legitimate interest that, by itself, gives the President the power to unilaterally deploy military forces into a hostile conflict?

#### Broad-spectrum military strategy is unsustainable – inevitable budget cuts ensure an unbalanced force that can’t deescalate low-intensity flare-ups

Johnson & Brickstein 12 (Stuart Johnson and Irv Blickstein are senior policy researchers at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, “Big Defense Cuts Are Coming, Regardless of the Fiscal Cliff,” 12-27, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/27/big-defense-cuts-are-coming-regardless-of-the-fiscal-cliff)

Regardless of the final resolution of "fiscal cliff" negotiations between President Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, the Department of Defense is likely to end up facing major budget reductions beyond the $487 billion announced last January. Where might the Pentagon find these savings? Its belt can be tightened by implementing operational efficiencies, overhauling acquisition practices, and rationalizing personnel compensation. But these alone may not yield the savings that the Secretary of Defense could be directed to find. Reductions of the magnitude implied by sequestration—some $500 billion over the coming decade—cannot be accommodated without a re-examination of current defense strategy. Across-the-board cuts or the elimination of programs that yield near-term savings may be tempting options, but would yield an unbalanced force in the short term and could require greater program outlays in future years. **The prudent approach is** to decide on **a strategic direction that provides** a framework **for prioritizing which forces** and equipment **the U**nited **S**tates **should preserve and determining which can be trimmed** or eliminated **with limited risk to security**. The strategic directions select and preserve key elements of the current strategy—which covers the full set described below—but will not be affordable in the face of substantial reductions in the department’s budget. To help begin this process, a team of RAND analysts examined three alternative strategies. They are not mutually exclusive: Pieces of each approach can be implemented in concert. While other strategic directions are certainly possible, the three plans we considered seemed the most likely to address developments on the world stage. In the first, we posit a scenario in which violent extremism and related insurgencies outlast U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and **remain a serious threat** to our nation and its interests. Therefore, readiness to respond to that threat must remain the top U.S. defense priority. Accordingly, no reductions in ground forces would be implemented beyond those currently planned, and savings would be generated principally through reductions to maritime and aviation forces. The primary risk associated with this strategy is that total-force modernization and the development of technologies critical to meeting future defense challenges could receive inadequate investment. A second alternative is to shift more responsibility for defending common interests to U.S. allies and partners, especially in Europe and Asia. European NATO allies could be ceded the lead responsibility for security on the Mediterranean littoral and for counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. These allies could also provide the bulk of ground and tactical air forces to deter Russian coercion, or even invasion, of Central European NATO members. The "pivot to Asia" outlined by the Obama administration would be limited to measures already under way, although the United States would still serve as the focal point for coordinating deterrence against Chinese assertiveness among our Asian allies. Those allies that have the capacity to confront China would be urged—and, in the best case, motivated—to do more. At the same time, the United States would redouble efforts to build the capacity of local partner security forces in countries at risk of insurgency or aggression, reducing the need for U.S. forces to deploy in large numbers to counter an insurgency or establish stability. Under this strategy, the United States would also be prepared to provide high end enabling capabilities to allies and partners, including battlefield surveillance and long range precision strikes. **The key risks** associated **with this strategic direction** **are** the flip side of its benefits: **Allies may fail to assume leadership** **in defense of common interests** in their region, and U.S. efforts to build the capacity of local forces could be stymied by the inefficiency or illegitimacy of partner governments. **The third option we examined** **involves acknowledging** that **the center of gravity for security challenges has shifted** to the western Pacific, **and** thus **forces oriented to the Euro-Atlantic region and the Middle East can be further reduced**. **The biggest risk here is the possibility that violent extremist threats to U.S. interests in those regions again** flares up, and **the U.S. response would have to rely on** a **smaller** component of ground and battlefield tactical air **forces**. The second and third strategic directions share a common goal. If the United States enters a conflict, it will focus on defeating aggressors and inflicting severe damage on an adversary’s military forces to neutralize their ability to repeat the aggression. Post-conflict operations would be limited to minimal stabilization efforts, not an extended, sizable presence of U.S. forces. **The** current strategy incorporates the full spectrum of missions described in these three alternatives. It carries less risk than any of the alternatives. But in the face of deep reductions in the defense budget, it is not affordable. Attaining real savings while maintaining national security requires **tradeoffs that can only be** optimized **by** strategic planning. Future decisions will not be easy and will not accommodate all defense constituencies. Any time reductions must be made, they should be made within a thoughtfully developed strategic framework and with a full understanding of the risks and benefits involved.

#### Warfare is now defined by non-state action – precise military strategy is required

George Friedman, June 11, 2008. “Geopolitical Weekly: The U.S. Air Force and the Next War,”

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitical\_weekly\_u\_s\_air\_force\_and\_next\_war

There is a school of thought in the military that argues that we have now entered the fourth generation of warfare. The first generation of war, according to this theory, involved columns and lines of troops firing muzzle-loaded weapons in volleys. The second generation consisted of warfare involving indirect fire (artillery) and massed movement, as seen in World War I. Third-generation warfare comprised mobile warfare, focused on outmaneuvering the enemy, penetrating enemy lines and encircling them, as was done with armor during World War II. The first three generations of warfare involved large numbers of troops, equipment and logistics. Large territorial organizations -- namely, nation-states -- were required to carry them out. Fourth-generation warfare is warfare carried out by nonstate actors using small, decentralized units and individuals to strike at enemy forces and, more important, create political support among the population. The classic example of fourth-generation warfare would be the intifadas carried out by Palestinians against Israel. They involved everything from rioters throwing rocks to kidnappings to suicide bombings. The Palestinians could not defeat the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), a classic third-generation force, in any conventional sense -- but neither could the IDF vanquish the intifadas, since the battlefield was the Palestinians themselves. So long as the Palestinians were prepared to support their fourth-generation warriors, they could extract an ongoing price against Israeli civilians and soldiers. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus became one of morale rather than materiel. This was the model, of course, the United States encountered in Iraq. Fourth-generation warfare has always existed. Imperial Britain faced it in Afghanistan. The United States faced it at the turn of the last century in the Philippines. King David waged fourth-generation warfare in Galilee. It has been a constant mode of warfare. The theorists of fourth-generational warfare are not arguing that the United States will face this type of war along with others, but that going forward, this type of warfare will dominate -- that the wars of the future will be fourth-generation wars. Nation-States and Fourth-Generation Warfare Implicit in this argument is the view that the nation-state, which has dominated warfare since the invention of firearms, is no longer the primary agent of wars. Each of the previous three generations of warfare required manpower and resources on a very large scale that only a nation-state could provide. Fidel Castro in the Cuban mountains, for example, could not field an armored division, an infantry brigade or a rifle regiment; it took a nation to fight the first three generations of warfare. The argument now is that nations are not the agents of wars but its victims. Wars will not be fought between nations, but between nations and subnational groups that are decentralized, sparse, dispersed and primarily conducting war to attack their target's morale. The very size of the forces dispersed by a nation-state makes them vulnerable to subnational groups by providing a target-rich environment. Being sparse and politically capable, the insurgent groups blend into the population and are difficult to ferret out and defeat. In such a war, the nation-state's primary mission is to identify the enemy, separate him from the population and destroy him. It is critical to be surgical in attacking the enemy, since the enemy wins whenever an attack by the nation-state hits the noncombatant population, even if its own forces are destroyed -- this is political warfare. Therefore, the key to success -- if success is possible -- is intelligence. It is necessary to know the enemy's whereabouts, and strike him when he is not near the noncombatant population.

#### Shift toward asymmetric and low-intensity warfare risks WMD terrorism – U.S. must adapt

MAX BOOT is Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Evolution of Irregular War. By: Boot, Max, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr 2013, Vol. 92, Issue 2

The long history of low-intensity conflict reveals not only how ubiquitous guerrilla warfare has been but also how often its importance has been ignored, thus setting the stage for future humiliations at the hands of determined irregulars. The U.S. Army has a particularly dismaying record of failing to adapt to "small wars," despite its considerable experience fighting Native Americans, Philippine insurrectos, the Vietcong, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and numerous other irregulars. To avoid similar calamities in the future, today's soldiers and policymakers need to accurately appraise the strengths and weaknesses of insurgents. It is important neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the potency of guerrilla warfare. Before 1945, since irregulars refused to engage in face-to-face battle, they were routinely underestimated. After 1945, however, popular sentiment swung too far in the other direction, enshrining guerrillas as superhuman figures. The truth lies somewhere in between: insurgents have honed their craft since 1945, but they still lose most of the time. Their growing success is due to the spread of communications technology and the increasing influence of public opinion. Both factors have sapped the will of states to engage in protracted counterinsurgencies, especially outside their own territories, and have heightened the ability of insurgents to survive even after suffering military setbacks. In the fight against insurgents, conventional tactics don't work. To defeat them, soldiers must focus not on chasing guerrillas but on securing the local population. Still, effective population-centric counterinsurgency is not as touchy-feely as commonly supposed. It involves much more than winning "hearts and minds" -- a phrase invented by Sir Henry Clinton, a British general during the American Revolution, and popularized by Sir Gerald Templer, a general during the Malayan Emergency, in the late 1940s and 1950s. The only way to gain control is to garrison troops 24 hours a day, seven days a week, among the civilians; periodic "sweep" or "cordon and search" operations fail, even when conducted by counterinsurgents as cruel as the Nazis, because civilians know that the rebels will return the moment the soldiers leave. Although control can be imposed at gunpoint, it can be maintained only if the security forces have some degree of popular legitimacy. In years past, it was not hard for foreign empires to gain the necessary legitimacy. But now, with nationalist sentiment having spread to every corner of the world, foreign counterinsurgents, such as the United States, face a tricky task, trying to buttress homegrown regimes that can win the support of their people and yet will still cooperate with the United States. What makes counterinsurgency all the more difficult is that there are few quick victories in this type of conflict. Since 1775, the average insurgency has lasted seven years (and since 1945, it has lasted almost ten years). Attempts by either insurgents or counterinsurgents to short-circuit the process usually backfire. The United States tried to do just that in the early years of both the Vietnam War and the Iraq war by using its conventional might to hunt down guerrillas in a push for what John Paul Vann, a famous U.S. military adviser in Vietnam, rightly decried as "fast, superficial results." It was only when the United States gave up hopes of a quick victory, ironically, that it started to get results, by implementing the tried-and-true tenets of population-centric counterinsurgency. In Vietnam, it was already too late, but in Iraq, the patient provision of security came just in time to avert an all-out civil war. The experiences of the United States in Iraq in 2007-8, Israel in the West Bank during the second intifada, the British in Northern Ireland, and Colombia in its ongoing fight against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) show that it is possible for democratic governments to fight insurgents effectively if they pay attention to what the U.S. military calls "information operations" (also known as "propaganda" and "public relations") and implement some version of a population-centric strategy. But these struggles also show that one should never enter into counterinsurgency lightly. Such wars are best avoided if possible. Even so, it is doubtful that the United States will be able to avoid them in the future any more than it has in the past. Given the United States' demonstrations of its mastery of conventional combat in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, few adversaries in the future will be foolish enough to put tank armies in the desert against an American force. Future foes are unlikely, in other words, to repeat the mistake of nineteenth-century Asians and Africans who fought European invaders in the preferred Western style. Guerrilla tactics, on the other hand, are proven effective, even against superpowers. In the future, irregulars might become deadlier still if they can get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction, especially a nuclear bomb. If that were to happen, a small terrorist cell the size of a platoon might gain more killing capacity than the entire army of a nonnuclear state. That is a sobering thought. It suggests that in the future, low-intensity conflict could pose even greater problems for the world's leading powers than it has in the past -- and those problems were already vexing enough.

#### Bioterrorism is coming – scientific breakthroughs, record availability, low-cost

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In Part I of this series, we examined how the advancement of synthetic biology has made bio-engineering accessible to the mainstream biological community. Non-state actors who wish to employ biological agents for ill intent are sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are becoming as applications of synthetic biology become more affordable and the probability of success increases with each scientific breakthrough. The willingness of non-state actors to engage in biological attacks is not a new concept; however, the past biological threat environment has been subdued compared to that of conventional or even chemical terrorism. The frequency and deadliness of biological attacks has, thankfully, been limited; much of which can be attributed to the technical complexity or apparent ineptitude of the perpetrators developing biological weapons. Despite the infrequency and ineffectiveness of biological attacks in the last four decades, the threat may be changing with the continued advancement of synthetic biology applications. Coupled with the ease of information sharing and a rapidly growing do-it-yourself-biology (DIYbio) movement (discussed in Part I), the chances of not only, more attacks, but potentially more deadly ones will inevitably increase. During the last half century terrorist organizations have consistently had an interest in using biological weapons as a means of attacking their targets, but only few have actually made a weapon and used it. The attraction is that terrorist activities with biological weapons are difficult to detect and even more difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility. Since 1971 there have been more than 113,113 terrorist attacks globally and 33 of them have been biological. The majority of bio-terrorism incidents recorded occurred during the year 2001 (17 of the 33); before 2001 there were 10 incidents and since 2001 there were 6 (not counting the most recent Ricin attacks). The lack of a discernable trend in use of bio-terrorism does not negate the clear intent of extremist organizations to use biological weapons. In fact, the capacity to harness biological weapons more effectively today only increases the risk that they will successfully be employed. The landscape is changing: previously the instances where biological attacks had the potential to do the most harm (e.g., Rajneeshees cult’s Salmonella attacks in 1984, Aum Shinri Kyo’s Botulinum toxin, and Anthrax attacks in the early 90’s) included non-state actors with access to large amounts of funding and scientists. Funding and a cadre of willing scientists does not guarantee success though. The assertion was thus made that biological weapons are not only expensive, they require advanced technical training to make and are even more difficult to effectively perpetrate acts of terrorism with. While it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the expense and expertise needed to create biological weapons has acted as a major deterrent for groups thinking of obtaining them, many experts would argue that the cost/expertise barrier makes the threat from biological attacks extremely small. This assertion is supported by the evidence that the vast majority of attacks have taken place in Western countries and was performed by Western citizens with advanced training in scientific research. In the past decade the cost/expertise assertion has become less accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks, there are a number of very dangerous and motivated organizations that have or are actively pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken organization has been the global Al Qaeda network, whose leaders have frequently and passionately called for the development (or purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The principal message from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included the call to use biological WMDs to terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has had a particular focus on biological and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere should seek to kill Westerners wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from around the world; however, the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their capabilities and killed or captured many of their assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption does not appear to have changed the aggressive attitude towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S. Intelligence has been concerned about AQAP attempting to make Ricin). The emergence of synthetic biology and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological WMDs. The low cost and significantly reduced level of necessary expertise may change how many non-state actors view biological weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say that suddenly anyone can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an effective biological weapon will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper than it has been in the past. The rapid advancements of synthetic biology could be a game changer, giving organizations currently pursuing biological weapons more options, and encouraging other organizations to reconsider their worth. Because the bar for attaining biological weapons has been lowered and is likely to continue to be lowered as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the international community begin to formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of synthetic biology. Disregard for this consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a potent biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not bound by international borders.

#### Asymmetric cooperation trumps their defense – terrorists can get WMD

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“Southern Flows,” http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/SouthernFlows314.pdf

While development specialists celebrate these trends, security analysts are rightly concerned that an increasingly interconnected world yields a lengthening proliferation supply chain for WMD technologies. Increasingly, even in sophisticated dual-use sectors, innovation and manufacturing is occurring in the Global South, which has traditionally represented the widest regulatory and enforcement vacuums. So-called trickle-up innovation means that countries once thought to be on the periphery of the information age are instead becoming central to it. Due to a lack of experience with dual-use industrial or innovative competences, real capacity shortfalls in enforcement, or competing national priorities, many governments in the developing world have become fertile environments for proliferant activities.9 Lacking adequate export and border controls, customs enforcement, police and judicial capacity, and sufficient rule-of-law standards, or pressed by skyrocketing violence resulting from transnational criminal activities, or internal public health crises (to name but a few challenges), these sometimes weak and fragile states are incapable of or unwilling to adequately implement global nonproliferation standards. The result is that despite significant nonproliferation investments over the last decades, the international community continues to find itself vulnerable to WMD proliferation to nonstate actors. Recent incidents of proliferation are instructive. Figure 2 indicates the number of states whose territories have been used or whose companies were knowingly or unknowingly complicit in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented incidents of materials trafficking, or were otherwise implicated in the A.Q. Khan affair. Although governments across the developed world were clearly complicit, the surprising distribution of developing world countries involved reflects their newfound role in innovating, manufacturing, financing, transshipping, or otherwise contributing to the efforts of committed proliferators. For these reasons, the failure to fully and effectively implement Resolution 1540 in countries of the Global South could have as important implications to the proliferation supply chain as similar failures in more technologically developed regions.

#### Bio-terrorism causes extinction – countermeasures fail

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¶ As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by ¶ no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several ¶ reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based ¶ on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty ¶ halted bioweapons development efforts in the United ¶ states and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons ¶ long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting ¶ edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely ¶ perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have ¶ been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. ¶ The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now ¶ as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of ¶ that era. tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose from.¶ Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal ¶ virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), ¶ accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild ¶ symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice ¶ already immune to the naturally occurring strains of ¶ mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected ¶ by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of ¶ researchers at Saint Louis University led by mark Buller ¶ picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to ¶ improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% ¶ lethal, although his team of investigators also devised ¶ combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were ¶ partially effective in protecting animals from the ¶ engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that ¶ the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. ¶ of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering ¶ with the virus will change that property, too.¶ Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other ¶ poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. ¶ Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another ¶ poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known ¶ antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many ¶ times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation ¶ couldn’t be done.¶ This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. ¶ Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial ¶ study done at the University of Wisconsin–madison in ¶ which virologists enumerated the changes one would need ¶ to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily ¶ transmitted from one mammal to another.14¶ Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear ¶ that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug ¶ resistance, many other parameters can be played with, ¶ given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop.¶ This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV, which ¶ is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and ¶ many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even¶ then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that ¶ hiv can take years to progress to aids, which can then ¶ take many more years to kill the victim. What makes hiv¶ so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed hiv to ¶ claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately ¶ 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing ¶ a highly uncertain future.15¶ A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, ¶ to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or ¶ months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual ¶ contact would be vastly more devastating than hiv. It ¶ could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: ¶ some scientist may do so first and publish the details.¶ given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in ¶ the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a ¶ detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly ¶ proposed in a scientific journal.¶ The ostensible purpose of that particular research was ¶ to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but ¶ similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 ¶ When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily ¶ detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If ¶ you challenge them to come up with improvements to the ¶ suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas.¶ Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not ¶ already, of bringing about the demise of the human race—¶ or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end ¶ high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or ¶ more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in ¶ mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically ¶ than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has ¶ frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing ¶ mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology terrorists included.¶ The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a german university, where he earned a master’s degree in urban ¶ planning—not a field he likely chose for its relevance to ¶ terrorism. A future set of terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. ¶ Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the ¶ United states accept students from all over the world. ¶ Thus it seems likely that sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something ¶ truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill ¶ millions or even billions of people. Indeed, the creation of ¶ such weapons within the next 20 years seems to be a virtual ¶ certainty. The repercussions of their use are hard to estimate. One approach is to look at how the scale of destruction they may cause compares with that of other calamities ¶ that the human race has faced.

#### Bio terror extinction outweighs the disad

Singer 2001

[Clifford Singer, Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/> research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_ XIII/Singer.htm Published Spring 2001]

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

**No nuclear winter – studies**

Seitz 2011 (Russell, Harvard University Center for International Affairs visiting scholar, “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,” Nature, 7-7-11, Vol 475, pg37, accessed 9-27-11, CMR)

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as **an exercise in mythology**. George **Rathjens of** the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is **the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory**,” (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/yujz84) and **climatologist** Kerry **Emanuel** observed that the subject had **“**become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity**”** (Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question.

#### Counterforce targeting checks

Mueller 2009 (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” p. 8)

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required. Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effects would be limited: 2,000 I-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles each would directly demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the United States, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a number of studies were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks. One of the most prominent of these considered several possibilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps be considered at least to begin to approach the rational-was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermo nuclear weapons would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an effort to destroy the country's strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target population centers, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.

#### Effective training and operational patterns can counter asymmetric WMD warfare

Michele A. Flournoy 8 (Fellow at the Center for a New American Security & U.S. Under-Secretary of Defense, “Strengthening the Readiness of the U.S. Military”, Prepared Statement of Michèle A. Flournoy)

At the same time, the United States must prepare for a broad range of future contingencies, from sustained, small-unit irregular warfare missions to military-to-military training and advising missions to high-end warfare against regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and other asymmetric means. Yet compressed training times between deployments mean that many of our enlisted personnel and officers have the time to train only for the missions immediately before them—in Iraq and Afghanistan—and not for the missions over the horizon. These just-in-time training conditions have created a degree of strategic risk, which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in his recent posture statement. As we at the Center for a New American Security wrote in our June, 2007 report on the ground forces, the United States is a global power with global interests, and we need our armed forces to be ready to respond whenever and wherever our strategic interests might be threatened. The absence of an adequate strategic reserve of ready ground forces must be addressed on an urgent basis. Readiness is the winning combination of personnel, equipment, and training in adequate quantity and quality for each unit. Each of these components of readiness has been under sustained and increasing stress over the past several years. For the ground forces, the readiness picture is largely—although not solely—centered on personnel while the Navy and the Air Force’s readiness challenges derive primarily from aging equipment. The Army continues to experience the greatest strain and the greatest recruitment challenges.

#### Planning and operation tempo are central to military readiness

Slattery 13 (Brian, “Military Readiness at a Tipping Point,” January 17, http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/17/military-readiness-at-a-tipping-point/)

“The readiness of our Armed Forces is at a tipping point.” That’s how General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, began a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee while discussing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) budget woes. He cites “budget **conditions** unfolding right now” as the cause of his concerns for U.S. military readiness. This refers to the still looming cuts under sequestration, which were merely delayed as part of the fiscal cliff deal rather than averted permanently. Furthermore, the lack of a real budget and use of a continuing resolution instead has **put** additional **strain on military planners, who do not know what their budgets will look like** months from now **and are operating under lower than expected levels** from the previous year. These combined budget concerns mean **DOD operating budgets will be 20 percent lower than the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request**, according to Dempsey. What effect this will have on specific military programs remains unclear. However, **the DOD already has** countless readiness concerns to show for years of underfunded modernization efforts. “Not enough people, not enough parts, not enough training, not enough everything,” lamented Vice Admiral Thomas Copeman, commander of naval surface forces for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He put the equation thusly: “[Operational] tempos have increased, resources have gone down.” This conundrum occurred before sequestration has taken effect, it is worth noting.

#### Restricting R2P solves – precursor to effective deployment structure and tempo

Vigeant 13 (Matthew E., J.D. 2015, Columbia Law School; M.P.A. 2015, Harvard Kennedy School, “Unforeseen Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for Congressional and Judicial Involvement”, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, online)

A. LIMITED RESOURCES IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY The first problem which R2P missions could create is the cost of such missions. We live in an era of large federal deficits and national debt,117 and in response to these pressing fiscal issues, members of government have called for cuts to federal spending. 118 One area that has already seen cuts, and faces more reductions, is the defense budget.119 This past year, in response to these anticipated constraints, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta ordered military commanders to slash $52 billion from their operating budgets on January 11, 2013.120 Yet while defense budgets are reduced, the proportion of defense spending that will go towards healthcare and veterans benefits is set to increase steadily over the coming decades.121 So to balance spending priorities, a recent RAND study suggests cutting back the military’s operations tempo abroad.122 Additionally, calls to cut the size of the military have been made. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution recently proposed a reduction in the number of active duty military personnel by 100,000 service members.123 A 2011 RAND study similarly called for a reduction to the Army’s overall force structure (active and reserve components), as did the 2010 Sustainable Defense Task Force Report, and a CATO Institute report suggested a dramatic reduction in the size of the active duty Army to only 360,000 troops.124 The Army is already set to fall over five years to 490,000 service member from a peak of 570,000, and the Marines are to drop to 182,000 from 202,000 service members, but further cuts will be required according to testimony Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel delivered this summer.125 Yet in the face of calls for a reduced operations tempo and smaller force structure, the global problem of failed and failing states is not going away.126 So there will be a continuing need for R2P missions, which will have to be conducted by a smaller military operating on a smaller budget. For instance, with cuts and an ongoing war in Afghanistan, there are calls for America to intervene in Syria in the name of R2P.127 One estimate put the size of the Syrian military at 280,000 soldiers, so any R2P intervention there would require a force larger than the one in Afghanistan currently.128 With a smaller military and a continued need for R2P missions, soldiers would face repeated deployments. But **the last decade of repeated deployments have led to a drop in the military’s ability to retain its best junior officers**; **a rise in military suicides**;129 significant family stress and uncertainty; and a number of other negative consequences.130

### Advantage 2 is Regionalism

#### Regionalism is inevitable – effectiveness is not guaranteed

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Five years into Obama's presidency, little progress has been made on that front, and few still expect it. Formal multilateral institutions continue to muddle along, holding their meetings and issuing their reports and taking some minor stabs at improving transnational problems at the margins. Yet despite the Obama administration's avowed ambition to integrate rising powers as full partners, there has been no movement to reform the composition of the UN Security Council to reflect new geopolitical realities. Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is comatose, NATO struggles to find its strategic purpose, and the International Energy Agency courts obsolescence by omitting China and India as members. The demand for international cooperation has not diminished. In fact, it is greater than ever, thanks to deepening economic interdependence, worsening environmental degradation, proliferating transnational threats, and accelerating technological change. But effective multilateral responses are increasingly occurring outside formal institutions, as frustrated actors turn to more convenient, ad hoc venues. The relative importance of legal treaties and universal bodies such as the UN is declining, as the United States and other states rely more on regional organizations, "minilateral" cooperation among relevant states, codes of conduct, and partnerships with nongovernmental actors. And these trends are only going to continue. The future will see not the renovation or the construction of a glistening new international architecture but rather the continued spread of an unattractive but adaptable multilateral sprawl that delivers a partial measure of international cooperation through a welter of informal arrangements and piecemeal approaches. "Global governance" is a slippery term. It refers not to world government (which nobody expects or wants anymore) but to something more practical: the collective effort by sovereign states, international organizations, and other nonstate actors to address common challenges and seize opportunities that transcend national frontiers. In domestic politics, governance is straightforward. It is provided by actual governments -- formal, hierarchical institutions with the authority to establish and enforce binding rules. Governance in the international or transnational sphere, however, is more complex and ambiguous. There is some hierarchy -- such as the special powers vested in the permanent members of the UN Security Council -- but international politics remain anarchic, with the system composed of independent sovereign units that recognize no higher authority. Cooperation under such anarchy is certainly possible. National governments often work together to establish common standards of behavior in spheres such as trade or security, embedding norms and rules in international institutions charged with providing global goods or mitigating global bads. But most cooperative multilateral bodies, even those binding under international law, lack real power to enforce compliance with collective decisions. What passes for governance is thus an ungainly patchwork of formal and informal institutions. Alongside long-standing universal membership bodies, there are various regional institutions, multilateral alliances and security groups, standing consultative mechanisms, self-selecting clubs, ad hoc coalitions, issue-specific arrangements, transnational professional networks, technical standard-setting bodies, global action networks, and more. States are still the dominant actors, but nonstate actors increasingly help shape the global agenda, define new rules, and monitor compliance with international obligations. The clutter is unsightly and unwieldy, but it has some advantages, as well. No single multilateral body could handle all the world's complex transnational problems, let alone do so effectively or nimbly. And the plurality of institutions and forums is not always dysfunctional, because it can offer states the chance to act relatively deftly and flexibly in responding to new challenges. But regardless of what one thinks of the current global disorder, it is clearly here to stay, and so the challenge is to make it work as well as possible. BIG GAME The centerpiece of contemporary global governance remains the UN, and the core of the UN system remains the Security Council -- a standing committee including the most powerful countries in the world. In theory, the Security Council could serve as a venue for coordinating international responses to the world's most important threats to global order. In practice, however, it regularly disappoints -- because the five permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) often disagree and because their veto power allows the disagreements to block action. This has been true since the UN'S inception, of course, but the Security Council's significance has diminished in recent decades as its composition has failed to track shifts in global power. The Obama administration, like its predecessors, has flirted with the idea of pushing a charter amendment to update the Security Council's membership but has remained wary due to concerns that an enlarged Security Council, with new and more empowered members, might decrease U.S. influence and leverage. But even if Washington were to push hard for change, the status quo would be incredibly hard to overturn. Any expansion plan would require approval by two-thirds of the 193 members of the UN General Assembly, as well as domestic ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council. And even those countries that favor expansion are deeply divided over which countries should benefit. So in practice, everyone pays lip service to enlargement while allowing the negotiations to drag on endlessly without any result. This situation seems likely to persist, but at the cost of a deepening crisis of legitimacy, effectiveness, and compliance, as the Security Council's composition diverges ever further from the distribution of global power. Dissatisfied players could conceivably launch an all-out political assault on the institution, but they are much more likely to simply bypass the council, seeking alternative frameworks in which to address their concerns. The dysfunction of the UN extends well beyond the Security Council, of course. Despite modest management reforms, the UN Secretariat and many UN agencies remain opaque, and their budgeting and operations are hamstrung by outdated personnel policies that encourage cronyism. Within the UN General Assembly, meanwhile, irresponsible actors who play to the galleries often dominate debates, and too many resolutions reflect encrusted regional and ideological blocs that somehow persist long after their sell-by date. With the Security Council dominated by the old guard, rising powers have begun eyeing possible alternative venues for achieving influence and expressing their concerns. Shifts in global power have always ultimately produced shifts in the institutional superstructure, but what is distinctive today is the simultaneous emergence of multiple power centers with regional and potentially global aspirations. As the United States courts relative decline and Europe and Japan stagnate, China, India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, and others are flexing their muscles, expanding their regional influence and insisting on greater voice within multilateral institutions. Despite these geopolitical shifts, however, no coherent alternative to today's Western order has emerged. This is true even among the much-hyped BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and, since 2012, South Africa. These countries have always lacked a common vision, but at least initially, they shared a confidence born of economic dynamism and resentment over a global economy they perceived as stacked to favor the West. In recent years, the BRICS have staked out a few common positions. They all embrace traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and resist heavy-handed Western intervention. Their summit communiqués condemn the dollar's privileges as the world's main reserve currency and insist on accelerated governance reforms within the international financial institutions. The BRICS have also agreed to create a full-fledged BRICS bank to provide development aid to countries and for issues the bloc defines as priorities, without the conditionality imposed by Western donors. Some observers anticipate the BRICS' emerging as an independent caucus and center of gravity within the G-20, rivaling the G-7 nations. But any such bifurcation of the world order between developed and major developing powers seems a distant prospect, for as much divides the BRICS as binds them. China and Russia have no interest in seeing any of their putative partners join them as permanent Security Council members; China and India are emerging strategic competitors with frontier disputes and divergent maritime interests; and China and Russia have their own tensions along the Siberian border. Differences in their internal regimes may also constrain their collaboration. India, Brazil, and South Africa -- boisterous multiparty democracies all -- have formed a coalition of their own (the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, or IBSA), as have China and Russia (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Conflicting economic interests also complicate intra-BRICS relations, something that might increase as the countries' growth slows.

#### Motives of cooperation determine the strength of regional cooperation

Ian Bremmer, January 27, 2012. “Decline of global institutions means we best embrace regionalism,” http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2012/01/27/decline-of-global-institutions-means-we-best-embrace-regionalism/#axzz2vb5yhZUB

The effectiveness of many global institutions is under severe strain, as they remain largely unchanged from their postwar forms. Newer institutions have not filled the gap, because, since its largely-successful 2009 response to the global financial crisis, the G20 has been increasingly ineffectual as well. The dearth of truly effective global institutions is consistent with a broader geopolitical trend, one in which the global agenda is increasingly influenced as much on a regional level as on a global one. With general agreement that the unbridled pursuit of individual national interests would produce suboptimal results, regionalism, while far from ideal, is emerging as a stopgap to the shortage of effective global decision-making. But while the trend towards regionalism is real, many of these newer alliances, both formal and informal, remain nascent, and are at best, marginally effective. Many serve as little more than high-level discussion groups with rudimentary governance structures and skeletal institutions. They are seemingly unable to tackle the common challenges facing their regions. They also suffer from hang-ups stemming from bilateral differences, in particular questions of financing commitments and support. Despite these shortcomings regional alliances continue to gain traction. Look at the increasingly assertive role of the Arab League in both Libya and Syria, the emphasis placed by the US on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and continuing efforts to shore up regional financing arrangements, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia. The challenge is to manage the rise of regionalism in a way that helps us solve systemic and far reaching global problems. Seamless co-ordination between and among regional organisations and global ones is by no means assured. This presents a good opportunity to craft these evolving regional alliances and institutions to boost their ability to co-ordinate with one another, as well as with existing global institutions.

#### American tendency to intervene stunts regionalism – security incentives maintain early organizational development

Ted Galen Carpenter, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, July 30, 2013. “Learning to Leave Bad Enough Alone: Washington’s Clumsy Meddling in Fragile Countries,” http://www.cato.org/blog/learning-leave-bad-enough-alone-washingtons-clumsy-meddling-fragile-countries

U.S. officials too often succumb to the temptation to try to impose order and justice in unstable or misgoverned societies around the world. The temptation is understandable. It is hard to learn about—much less watch on the nightly news—brutality, bloodshed, and gross injustice and not want to do something about it. Some foreign policy intellectuals, including the new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, have become strident lobbyists for the notion of a “responsibility to protect” vulnerable populations. But it is a temptation that wise policy makers should avoid. U.S. meddling has frequently caused already bad situations to deteriorate further—especially when Washington has based its humanitarian interventions on the false premise that the subject of our attentions is, or at least ought to be, a coherent nation state. As I point out in an article over at The National Interest, U.S. administrations have made that blunder in Bosnia, Iraq, Libya, and other places. In many parts of the world, the Western concept of a nation state is quite weak, and the concepts of democracy and individual rights are even less developed. The primary loyalty of an inhabitant is likely to be to a clan, tribe, ethnic group or religion. U.S. officials appear to have difficulty grasping that point, and as a result, the United States barges into fragile societies, disrupting what modest order may exist. Washington’s military interventions flail about, shattering delicate political and social connections and disrupting domestic balances of power. An especially naive and pernicious U.S. habit has been to try to midwife a strong national government in client states when the real power and cohesion lies at the local or subregional level. Thus, Washington still insists on keeping the chronically dysfunctional pretend country of Bosnia intact and on international life support more than 17 years after imposing the Dayton peace accords that ended the fighting there. Similarly, the United States harbored the illusion that Hamid Karzai could run a strong, pro-Western, democratic Afghan central government from Kabul, and even Karzai’s ineptitude and extensive misdeeds have not entirely dispelled that notion. In both cases, the national cohesion, underlying democratic values, and strong civil societies needed for such a scheme to work are woefully lacking.

#### Intervention-based dependence must transform into a motive for regional organization

MICHAEL J. MAZARR is Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm. By: Mazarr, Michael J., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb 2014, Vol. 93, Issue 1

In trying to force change on recalcitrant governments and societies, moreover, outside interventions undermine internal motives for reform by transferring responsibility for a better future from local leaders to external actors. The outside power needs cooperation from its local clients more than they need its sponsorship. The result is a dependency paradox that impedes reform. As success stories from South Korea to Chile show, the path from state weakness to strength has to be traveled by the states themselves, gradually and fitfully, most often under the influence of strong, decisive leadership from visionary architects of governance. It is an organic, grass-roots process that must respect the unique social, cultural, economic, political, and religious contexts of each country. And although it can be encouraged and even modestly shaped by outside contributions and pressure, it cannot be imposed.

#### Plan encourages regionalism – restricted American commitment prompts quick regional security agreements that branch to climate change

Nikolas Gvosdev, the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College, September 11, 2012. “The End of Optimism: Global Order in an Age of Paralysis,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12321/the-end-of-optimism-global-order-in-an-age-of-paralysis

If the bargain for balancing sovereignty concerns with humanitarian impulses that prevailed for the past two decades is indeed over, then one of two possible outcomes will be the result. The first is simply much more permanent deadlock within the United Nations, if not a full return to the standoffs of the Cold War period, and a refusal on the part of the sovereignty club to allow any clear guidelines to be formulated for defining the conditions that must trigger a “responsibility to protect” intervention. The other, more extreme possibility is the effective breakdown of the U.N. system as more ad hoc coalitions emerge to take international law into their own hands, following the precedent set in the 1999 Kosovo intervention. Either way, it does not bode well for the elder Bush’s vision for renewed international cooperation. The other defining reality of this decade is the ongoing strain on finances. If the United States -- and to a similar extent, Europe -- ceases to be willing to pay as much for the maintenance of a global architecture, as well as to make it worthwhile for potential opponents to acquiesce to Western preferences, no other state is likely to step forward to fill that vacuum. What may take its place is a series of basic, quid pro quo arrangements to regulate overall international interaction in terms of general security and perhaps even some efforts to deal with climate change. By this arrangement, smaller groups of countries will choose to deepen their connections and accept more-binding rules of conduct, ushering in an age of new “sub-world” orders.

#### Responsibility to Protect hurts cooperative dynamics – switch to regionalism creates momentum to solve warming

Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush’s special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan, July 24, 2013. “What International Community?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-tools-of-global-cooperation-by-richard-n--haass

Another area where there is less international community than meets the eye is human suffering. Governments that attack their own people on a large scale, or allow such attacks to be carried out, expose themselves to the threat of outside intervention. This “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P, was enshrined by the UN in 2005. But many governments are concerned that R2P raises expectations that they will act, which could prove costly in terms of lives, military expenditure, and commercial priorities. Some governments are also worried that R2P could be turned on them. Russian and Chinese reticence about pressuring governments that deserve censure and sanction stems partly from such concerns; the absence of consensus on Syria is just one result.¶ In short, those looking to the international community to deal with the world’s problems will be disappointed. This is not reason for despair or grounds for acting unilaterally. But so long as “international community” is more hope than reality, multilateralism will have to become more varied.¶ In the trade area, this implies regional and bilateral accords. On climate change, it makes sense to seek “mini-agreements” that set minimum common standards for fuel efficiency, slow deforestation, or limit the largest economies’ carbon output.¶ In these and other areas, governments will need to rally around regional undertakings, form coalitions of the relevant or willing, or simply seek understandings among countries to do their best to adopt common policies. Such approaches may lack the reach and legitimacy of formal global undertakings, but they do have the advantage of getting something done.

#### Only regionalism can solve warming

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WELCOME TO THE G-X WORLD The analysts Ian Bremmer and David Gordon have written about the emergence of a "G-Zero world," in which collective global leadership is almost impossible thanks to a global diffusion of power among countries with widely divergent interests. But what really marks the contemporary era is not the absence of multilateralism but its astonishing diversity. Collective action is no longer focused solely, or even primarily, on the UN and other universal, treaty-based institutions, nor even on a single apex forum such as the G-20. Rather, governments have taken to operating in many venues simultaneously, participating in a bewildering array of issue-specific networks and partnerships whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, and relevant capabilities. A hallmark of this "G-X" world is the temporary coalition of strange bedfellows. Consider the multinational antipiracy armada that has emerged in the Indian Ocean. This loosely coordinated flotilla involves naval vessels from not only the United States and its NATO allies but also China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Yemen. These countries might disagree on many issues, but they have found common cause in securing sea-lanes off the African coast. At the same time, the G-X world permits the United States to strengthen its links within the traditional West. Take the surprisingly resilient G-8, composed of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and Russia (plus the EU). For years, pundits have predicted the G-8's demise, and yet it still moves. The G-8 allows advanced market democracies to coordinate their positions on sensitive political and security issues -- just as the parallel financially focused G-7 permits them to harmonize their macroeconomic policies. With the exception of authoritarian Russia, unwisely added in 1997, G-8 members share similar worldviews and values, strategic interests, and major policy preferences. This like-mindedness facilitates policy coordination on matters ranging from human rights to humanitarian intervention, rogue states to regional stability. The wealthy G-8 members also possess distinctive assets -- financial, diplomatic, military, and ideological -- to deploy in the service of their convictions. At the Deauville summit of May 2011, the G-8 moved quickly to offer diplomatic support and material assistance to the Arab Spring countries. That action reaffirmed the G-8 as a practical and symbolic anchor of the Western liberal order while reminding the world that the G-8 remains the overwhelming source of official development assistance. In global governance, as elsewhere, necessity is the mother of invention, and the global credit crisis that struck with full force in 2008 led to the rise to prominence of a relatively new international grouping, the G-20. Facing the potential meltdown of the international financial system, leaders of the world's major economies -- both developed and developing -- shared an overriding interest in avoiding a second Great Depression. Stuck in the same lifeboat, they assented to a slew of institutional innovations, including elevating the G-20 finance ministers' group to the leaders' level, creating an exclusive global crisis-response committee. The G-20 quickly racked up some notable achievements. It injected unprecedented liquidity into the world economy through coordinated national actions, including some $5 trillion in stimulus at the London summit of April 2009. It created the Financial Stability Board, charged with developing new regulatory standards for systemically important financial institutions, and insisted on new bank capital account requirements under the Basel III agreement. It revitalized and augmented the coffers of the once-moribund International Monetary Fund and negotiated governance reforms within the World Bank and the IMF to give greater voice to emerging economies. And its members adopted "standstill" provisions to avoid a recurrence of the ruinous tit-for-tat trade protectionism of the 1930s. As the immediate panic receded and an uneven global recovery took hold, however, narrow national interests again came to the fore, slowing the G-20's momentum. For the past four years, the G-20 -- whose heterogeneous members possess diverse values, political systems, and levels of development -- has struggled to evolve from a short-term crisis manager to a longer-term steering group for the global economy. The reform of major international financial institutions has also stalled, as established (notably European) powers resist reallocating voting weight and governing board seats. So what looked for a brief moment like the dawn of a newly preeminent global forum proved to be just one more outlet store in the sprawl. GOVERNANCE IN PIECES For much of the past two decades, UN mega-conferences dominated multilateral diplomacy. But when it comes to multilateralism, bigger is rarely better, and the era of the mega-conference is ending as major powers recognize the futility of negotiating comprehensive international agreements among 193 UN member states, in the full glare of the media and alongside tens of thousands of activists, interest groups, and hangers-on. Countries will continue to assemble for annual confabs, such as the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in the Sisyphean quest to secure "binding" commitments from developed and developing countries. But that circus will increasingly become a sideshow, as the action shifts to less formal settings and narrower groupings of the relevant and capable. Already, the 17 largest greenhouse gas emitters have created the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, seeking breakthroughs outside the lumbering UNFCCC. TO date, the forum has underdelivered. But more tangible progress has occurred through parallel national efforts, as states pledge to undertake a menu of domestic actions, which they subsequently submit to the forum for collective review. There is a more general lesson here. Faced with fiendishly complex issues, such as climate change, transnational networks of government officials now seek incremental progress by disaggregating those issues into manageable chunks and agreeing to coordinate action on specific agenda items. Call it "global governance in pieces." For climate change, this means abandoning the quest for an elusive soup-to-nuts agreement to mitigate and adapt to global warming. Instead, negotiators pursue separate initiatives, such as phasing out wasteful fossil fuel subsidies, launching minilateral clean technology partnerships, and expanding the UN Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries, among other worth-while schemes. The result is not a unitary international regime grounded in a single institution or treaty but a cluster of complementary activities that political scientists call a "regime complex." Something similar is happening in global health, where the once-premier World Health Organization now shares policy space and a division of labor with other major organizations, such as the World Bank; specialized UN agencies, such as UNAIDS; public-private partnerships, such as the GAVI Alliance (formerly called the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization); philanthropic organizations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; consultative bodies, such as the eight-nation (plus the EU) Global Health Security Initiative; and multi-stakeholder bodies, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The upshot is a disaggregated system of global health governance. Sometimes, the piecemeal approach may be able to achieve more than its stagnant universalist alternative.

#### Warming now – every reduction key

Nuccitelli 12

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We're not yet committed to surpassing 2°C global warming, but as Watson noted, we are quickly running out of time to realistically give ourselves a chance to stay below that 'danger limit'. However, 2°C is not a do-or-die threshold. Every bit of CO2 emissions we can reduce means that much avoided future warming, which means that much avoided climate change impacts. As Lonnie Thompson noted, the more global warming we manage to mitigate, the less adaption and suffering we will be forced to cope with in the future. Realistically, based on the current political climate (which we will explore in another post next week), limiting global warming to 2°C is probably the best we can do. However, there is a big difference between 2°C and 3°C, between 3°C and 4°C, and anything greater than 4°C can probably accurately be described as catastrophic, since various tipping points are expected to be triggered at this level. Right now, we are on track for the catastrophic consequences (widespread coral mortality, mass extinctions, hundreds of millions of people adversely impacted by droughts, floods, heat waves, etc.). But we're not stuck on that track just yet, and we need to move ourselves as far off of it as possible by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions as soon and as much as possible. There are of course many people who believe that the planet will not warm as much, or that the impacts of the associated climate change will be as bad as the body of scientific evidence suggests. That is certainly a possiblity, and we very much hope that their optimistic view is correct. However, what we have presented here is the best summary of scientific evidence available, and it paints a very bleak picture if we fail to rapidly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. If we continue forward on our current path, catastrophe is not just a possible outcome, it is the most probable outcome. And an intelligent risk management approach would involve taking steps to prevent a catastrophic scenario if it were a mere possibility, let alone the most probable outcome. This is especially true since the most important component of the solution - carbon pricing - can be implemented at a relatively low cost, and a far lower cost than trying to adapt to the climate change consequences we have discussed here (Figure 4).

#### Global warming is real, anthropogenic, and causes extinction

Flournoy 12 – PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, Former Associate Dean @ State University of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio University (Don, "Solar Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book)

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his **NASA colleagues** were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have **no doubt** global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction **of human species**, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 ) . It was this NASA scientist’s conclusion that humankind must now embark on the next era of “sustainable energy consumption and re-supply, the most obvious source of which is the mighty energy resource of our Sun” (Hsu 2010 ) (Fig . 2.1 ).

#### Warming kills ocean resilience

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

The high emission scenarios would also result in very high carbon dioxide concentrations and ocean acidification, as can be seen in Figure 25 and Figure 26. The increase of carbon dioxide concentration to the present-day value of 390 ppm has caused the pH to drop by 0.1 since preindustrial conditions. This has increased ocean acidity, which because of the logarithmic scale of pH is equivalent to a 30 percent increase in ocean acidity (concentration of hydrogen ions). The scenarios of 4°C warming or more by 2100 correspond to a carbon dioxide concentration of above 800 ppm and lead to a further decrease of pH by another 0.3, equivalent to a 150 percent acidity increase since preindustrial levels. Ongoing ocean acidification is likely to have very severe consequences for coral reefs, various species of marine calcifying organisms, and ocean ecosystems generally (for example, Vézina & Hoegh-Guldberg 2008; Hofmann and Schellnhuber 2009). A recent review shows that the degree and timescale of ocean acidification resulting from anthropogenic CO2 emissions appears to be greater than during any of the ocean acidification events identified so far over the geological past, dating back millions of years and including several mass extinction events (Zeebe 2012). If atmospheric CO2 reaches 450 ppm, coral reef growth around the world is expected to slow down considerably and at 550 ppm reefs are expected to start to dissolve (Cao and Caldeira 2008; Silverman et al. 2009). Reduced growth, coral skeleton weakening, and increased temperature dependence would start to affect coral reefs already below 450 ppm. Thus, a CO2 level of below 350 ppm appears to be required for the long-term survival of coral reefs, if multiple stressors, such as high ocean surface-water temperature events, sea-level rise, and deterioration in water quality, are included (Veron et al. 2009). Based on an estimate of the relationship between atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration and surface ocean acidity (Bernie, Lowe, Tyrrell, and Legge 2010), only very low emission scenarios are able to halt and ultimately reverse ocean acidification (Figure 26). An important caveat on these results is that the approach used here is likely to be valid only for relatively short timescales. If mitigation measures are not implemented soon to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, then ocean acidification can be expected to extend into the deep ocean. The calculations shown refer only to the response of the ocean surface layers, and once ocean acidification has spread more thoroughly, slowing and reversing this will be much more difficult. This would further add significant stress to marine ecosystems already under pressure from human influences, such as overfishing and pollution.

**Extinction, too**

Kristof 6 (NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, American journalist, author, op-ed columnist, and a winner of two Pulitzer Prizes, “Scandal Below the Surface”, Oct 31, 2006, http://select.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/opinion/31kristof.html?\_r=1, CMR)

If you think of the earth’s surface as a great beaker, then it’s filled mostly with ocean water. It is slightly alkaline, and that’s what creates a hospitable home for fish, coral reefs and plankton — and indirectly, higher up the food chain, for us. But scientists have discovered that the carbon dioxide (CO2) we’re spewing into the air doesn’t just heat up the atmosphere and lead to rising seas. Much of that carbon is absorbed by the oceans, and there it produces carbonic acid — the same stuff found in soda pop. That makes oceans a bit more acidic, impairing the ability of certain shellfish to produce shells, which, like coral reefs, are made of calcium carbonate. A recent article in Scientific American explained the indignity of being a dissolving mollusk in an acidic ocean: “Drop a piece of chalk (calcium carbonate) into a glass of vinegar (a mild acid) if you need a demonstration of the general worry: the chalk will begin dissolving immediately.” The more acidic waters may spell the end, at least in higher latitudes, of some of the tiniest variations of shellfish — certain plankton and tiny snails called pteropods. This would **disrupt the food chain,** possibly killing off many whales and fish, and rippling up all the way to humans. We stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of plankton. “There have been a couple of very big events in geological history where the carbon cycle changed dramatically,” said Scott Doney, senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts. One was an abrupt warming that took place 55 million years ago in conjunction with acidification of the oceans and **mass extinctions**. Most scientists don’t believe we’re headed toward a man-made variant on that episode — not **yet**, at any rate. But many worry that we’re hurtling into unknown dangers. “Whether in 20 years or 100 years, I think marine ecosystems are going to be dramatically different by the end of this century, and that’ll lead to **extinction events**,” Mr. Doney added. “This is the only habitable planet we have,” he said. “The damage we do is going to be felt by **all the generations to come.”** So that should be one of the great political issues for this century — the vandalism we’re committing to our planet because of our refusal to curb greenhouse gases. Yet the subject is barely debated in this campaign. Changes in ocean chemistry are only one among many damaging consequences of carbon emissions. Evidence is also growing about the more familiar dangers: melting glaciers, changing rainfall patterns, rising seas and more powerful hurricanes. Last year, the World Health Organization released a study indicating that climate change results in an extra 150,000 deaths and five million sicknesses each year, by causing the spread of malaria, diarrhea, malnutrition and other ailments. A report prepared for the British government and published yesterday, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, warned that inaction “could create risks of major disruption to economic and social activity, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.” If emissions are not curbed, climate change will cut 5 percent to 20 percent of global G.D.P. each year, declared the mammoth report. “In contrast,” it said, “the costs of action — reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change — can be limited to around 1 percent of global G.D.P. each year.” Some analysts put the costs of action higher, but most agree that it makes sense to invest far more in alternative energy sources, both to wean ourselves of oil and to reduce the strain on our planet. We know what is needed: a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, a post-Kyoto accord on emissions cutbacks, and major research on alternative energy sources. But as The Times’s Andrew Revkin noted yesterday, spending on energy research and development has fallen by more than half, after inflation, since 1979.

### The Plan

#### The United States federal government should prohibit the President of the United States from unilaterally deploying Armed Forces on Responsibility to Protect missions.

### Solvency

#### Restricting presidential authority to deploy on an R2P basis is necessary to limit interventions and make them more effective when they do happen

Vigeant 13 (Matthew E., J.D. 2015, Columbia Law School; M.P.A. 2015, Harvard Kennedy School, “Unforeseen Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for Congressional and Judicial Involvement”, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, online)

In order to better weigh whether a R2P mission is worth the potential cost, the President’s ability to unilaterally deploy the military on R2P missions must be constrained to give the Legislative Branch a voice on such deployments. Not every R2P intervention is bad — perhaps U.S. intervention in Rwanda could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. But every R2P situation will be different, and will present unique scenarios and risks. So rather than giving total power to one person and his advisors to commit the U.S. to intervention in another sovereign state’s affairs, Congress — the branch whose members are elected to directly represent the people — should serve as a check over whether American lives should be risked for R2P deployments. As discussed in Section III, the extent of the political branches powers in national security and foreign affairs are decided by custom and historical practice.136 If Congress were to pass a bill restricting the President’s ability to unilaterally deploy military force on R2P missions, it would effectively block this power, because “as a matter of constitutional law, the President and the Congress share authority to respond to national security issues. The President does not possess exclusive authority to act, and Congress has the constitutional right to participate, in the national security process.”137 Yet Congress has not passed such a bill and it has increasingly been distanced from the national security decision-making process, perhaps because of “(1) the executive’s incentive and ability to act quickly and decisively; (2) Congress’s own acquiescence due to poorly drafted statutes, inadequate legislative tools, and a lack of political will; and (3) the judiciary’s acquiescence to unilateral assertions of presidential power.”138 Thus to serve as a check on deployments for R2P missions, Congress should exercise its national security powers and pass a bill prohibiting the President from unilaterally deploying military forces on R2P missions. In May 2012, in response to the Libyan intervention, Senator James Webb introduced one such bill, his “Humanitarian Intervention” Bill. The Bill would have required the President to obtain congressional approval before using military force for humanitarian or peacekeeping operations, while also requiring debate on such a request begin within days, and a vote "in a timely manner.”139 Webb introduced this bill because “[w]e would be facing the exact same constitutional challenges [over humanitarian interventions] no matter the party of the president. In fact, unless we resolve this matter, there is no doubt that we someday will.”140 A bill similar to Webb’s would act as a check on hasty Executive decision-making by giving Congress a voice, yet would also allow for a speedy U.S. response if needed under its timely debate procedures. This is the type of solution Congress should enact. Congress is given a role under both the Constitution and the WPR in authorizing humanitarian interventions, as Senator Javits explicitly stated during debate over the WPR, and passing legislation similar to the Webb bill would enable Congress to fulfill that role. The added check of Congress also helps to avoid the problems discussed in Part IV by interjecting a fresh perspective from both parties into a decision-making process that, if left to the Executive alone, could be overtaken by the singular view of the President and the peculiarities of that office. But even if Congress passed legislation similar to Webb’s Humanitarian Intervention Bill, to ensure an actual check on the President, Courts must be willing to uphold and enforce such legislation. Yet, courts often duck war powers questions under various justiciability and standing doctrines.141 For example, during President Clinton’s unilateral intervention in Kosovo, members of Congress brought suit claiming that when President Clinton’s deployment of troops extended past the sixty-day window with no authorization from Congress he had violated the WPR.142 But despite facing a clear violation of the text of the WPR, the court dismissed the suit for lack of standing under the theory that unless a Congress member’s voting power has been totally eviscerated, their remedy is to utilize the political process, not the courts.143 Recently, a federal district court judge in Washington, D.C., dismissed a similar War Powers violation suit by members of Congress over the Libyan intervention.144 In Kucinich v. Obama, the District Court Judge went so far as to state that “the Court finds it frustrating to expend time and effort adjudicating the re-litigation of [this] settled question[] of law” that a member of Congress lacks standing to challenge a Presidential violation of the WPR.145 When Senator Lee asked Harold Koh during his Senate testimony over Libya if Congress could maintain a war powers suit over the Libyan intervention in light of modern, judge-made justiciability doctrines, Koh responded “I think it is highly unlikely that it would be justiciable. There was in the Vietnam era a number of famous cases, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, where some cases did get into court. But the general pattern of the case law since then has been that these suits have been dismissed on some preliminary ground.”146 Therefore, to ensure that any legislation restricting the Executive’s ability to conduct unilateral R2P missions is actually enforced, courts should be willing to adjudicate war and foreign affairs powers issues, especially when they are facial violations of the WPR. As Judge Tatel put it in Clinton v. Campbell, judges handle complex constitutional questions all of the time, why should national security questions be any different?147 Courts are able tell what war is; they did so in Bas v. Tingy, The Prize Cases, and various Vietnam War suits.148 When ruling on these issues, courts are not judging the wisdom of interventions, only their legality, and courts have a responsibility to the people to be the final arbiter of the law.149 To enable courts to play their role, any humanitarian intervention legislation should include a provision explicitly providing individual Congress members standing to challenge Presidential unilateral deployments. Harold Koh once agreed with these solutions as a proper means to check a President’s national security powers.150 According to Koh, Congress [should] adopt an omnibus framework statute to give itself greater control over the national security process and national security decisions made under that framework should be “fully subject to judicial review.”151 R2P missions present many possible dangers. While no past unilateral deployment has ever been premised solely on humanitarian interests, due to the evolution of unilateral Presidential deployments and the concomitant acquiescence of Congress to this practice, if the President chose to deploy troops in the name of R2P, he would be legally justified in doing so. Therefore, to ensure that a President does not rashly involve American soldiers in a mission that leads to deadly consequences, Congress should restrain the President’s ability to unilaterally conduct R2P missions. But in order to ensure a legislative restraint is actually enforced, courts must modify their justiciability doctrines and be willing to weigh in on national security cases, which are no harder to judge or more abstract than other issues courts deal with on a daily basis.

#### No unique flex turns – emboldenment and perception of overstretch reigns

Gaffney 13 (Frank, president of the Center for Security Policy, assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan, “Making things worse in Syria,” 9/3, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/9/gaffney-making-things-worse-in-syria/>)

More to the point, “r**esponsibility** top**rotect**” **ensures** that **the U.S. military’s** finite — **and currently** seriously overstretched — **resources will be put to** use punishing those whose barbarism violates “**international norms**,” the **enforcement** of which becomes defined as a vital American interest. Consequently, a vote for Mr. Obama’s Syria resolution is a vote to legitimate and authorize the transnationalist grab for control of the only armed forces we have, **at the expense of our** sovereignty and, inevitably, of our **security**. As to the possibility that, absent our attack, we will confront more chemical weapons use, it cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, no one — no one — has explained how “degrading Mr. Assad’s capabilities” and “changing the momentum of the battlefield” (as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee resolution demands) will ensure greater control of the Syrian dictator’s vast chemical arsenal. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Gen. Martin Dempsey, has testified that the U.S. strike will target the regime’s weapons used to protect that arsenal. Even in the absence of such a deliberate purpose, we have to assume that either the designated terrorist group allied with Mr. Assad (Hezbollah) or the one dominating the opposition (al Qaeda) will gain access to some of these arms. Consequently, those voting for the president’s resolution have no claim to a higher moral authority than the opponents when it comes to preventing future examples of the horrific incidents captured in videos of Syrian victims that the administration is shamelessly exploiting to buffalo legislators. Then, **there is the ultimate appeal being made to patriots** — in and out of the Congress — **found in the assertion that not just the president’s credibility, but the nation’s, is on the line**. Some Republican legislators and a number of former officials of GOP administrations have embraced this argument. **They warn** that **the repercussions of defeating** Mr. **Obama** this time **will be to damage confidence in America** for the duration of his presidency, with potentially devastating effects. **Unfortunately,** inordinate damage **has** already been done **to our leadership** in the world as a result of nearly five years of what passes for this president’s security policymaking. This has been the predictable effect of the Obama Doctrine, which I have reduced to nine words: emboldening our enemies, undermining our allies, diminishing our country. As Norman Podhoretz trenchantly put it in The Wall Street Journal on Monday: “[Obama’s] foreign policy, far from a dismal failure, is a brilliant success as measured by what he intended all along to accomplish . The fundamental transformation he wished to achieve here was to reduce the country’s power and influence.” As a result, the question before the Congress this week is not whether U.S. credibility will be degraded by its repudiation of what is, in fact, more of a Gulf of Tonkin-style blank check than a restrictive authorization for only a limited military action. **Rather, it is this: Will we be able to measure the marginal** additional **harm done to** our nation’s prestige, power and influence — all ingredients in its **credibility** — **given** the **damage** Mr. **Obama has already done to them**? It was predictable, and predicted, that **the whirlwind** Mr. Obama has sown would be reaped eventually. That **moment may be at hand. Thanks** in no small measure **to** the **decisions made to date — including those that have hollowed out our military, reduced our presence and power-projection capabilities** and contributed to the metastasizing of the Islamist cancer — there are no good options in Syria. Unfortunately, the worst of them at the moment appears to be our going to war there, and Congress should decline to do so.

#### No uniqueness to the flex DA – challengers already acting on Obama weakness, only a risk of the AFF scenario – countries model US intervention strategy

Justin Sink 3/18-14 “Republicans demand Obama get tougher with Putin over Ukraine,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/europe/201132-republicans-demand-obama-get-tougher-with-putin-on-ukraine>

On Sunday, voters in Crimea decided to join Russia in a referendum the administration described as corrupt.¶ Critics and supporters of Obama say his hand has been weakened by U.S. fatigue with an era defined by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the president’s most vociferous opponents say Obama has exacerbated the situation with his actions, most notably on Syria.¶ Sen. John McCain (Ariz.), the Republican bested by Obama in the 2008 race, said U.S. credibility was eroded when Obama stepped back from threatened military action in Syria, despite his proclaimed “red line” against chemical weapons use.¶ Obama’s own advisers were surprised by his decision last September to ask Congress for authorization to strike Syria.¶ It quickly became clear that Congress would not do so, and Putin eventually brokered a deal in which military action was avoided and Syrian President Bashar Assad gave up his chemical weapons. More than six months later, Assad has consolidated his power, and there have been complaints about the degree to which he has given up his weapons.¶ “The assessment that Putin made after taking to Obama to cleaners on Syria was ‘I can do whatever I want,’ ” said Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute.¶ “Obama’s profile has been so weak that it has encouraged leaders who have contempt for weakness like Putin to take advantage.”

# 2AC

### Circumvention

#### No circumvention – empirically circumvention has taken shape as the president strengthening other areas of authority

Barron and Lederman, 2008 (David, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Martin, Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center; “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis)

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also illuminates the practices of the President in creating the constitutional law of war powers at the "lowest ebb." Given the apparent advantages to the Executive of possessing preclusive powers in this area, it is tempting to think that Commanders in Chief would always have claimed a unilateral and unregulable authority to determine the conduct of military operations. And yet, as we show, for most of our history, the presidential practice was otherwise. Several of our most esteemed Presidents - Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts, among others - never invoked the sort of preclusive claims of authority that some modern Presidents appear to embrace without pause. In fact, no Chief Executive did so in any clear way until the onset of the Korean War, even when they confronted problematic restrictions, some of which could not be fully interpreted away and some of which even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed. Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive branch has waxed and waned. No consensus among modern Presidents has crystallized. Indeed, rather than denying the authority of Congress to act in this area, some modern Presidents, like their predecessors, have acknowledged the constitutionality of legislative regulation. They have therefore concentrated their efforts on making effective use of other presidential authorities and institutional [\*949] advantages to shape military matters to their preferred design. n11 In sum, there has been much less executive assertion of an inviolate power over the conduct of military campaigns than one might think. And, perhaps most importantly, until recently there has been almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory. This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we think, best understood as evidence of the timidity of prior Commanders in Chief. Nor do we think it is the accidental result of political conditions that just happened to make it expedient for all of these Executives to refrain from lodging such a constitutional objection. This consistent pattern of executive behavior is more accurately viewed as reflecting deeply rooted norms and understandings of how the Constitution structures conflict between the branches over war. In particular, this well-developed executive branch practice appears to be premised on the assumption that the constitutional plan requires the nation's chief commander to guard his supervisory powers over the military chain of command jealously, to be willing to act in times of exigency if Congress is not available for consultation, and to use the very powerful weapon of the veto to forestall unacceptable limits proposed in the midst of military conflict - but that otherwise, the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions. In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial military judgments to a sympathetic but sometimes skeptical or demanding legislature and nation, not only for the sake of liberty, but also for effective and prudent conduct of military operations. Justice Jackson's famous instruction that "with all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations" n12 continues to have a strong pull on the constitutional imagination. n13 What emerges from our analysis is how much pull it seemed to [\*950] have on the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

#### Courts solve non-compliance

Garcia, 2012 (Michael John, Legislative Attorney, “War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution”, Congressional Research Service, February 17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf)

The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the aforementioned procedural barriers constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to resolving the statutory or constitutional issues concerning war powers. All of the opinions to date indicate that the barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction stems from the posture of the cases, not some institutional shortcoming. If this view prevails, both statutory and constitutional war powers issues can be judicially determined if a legal, as distinguished from a political, impasse is created. It has been suggested that this can come about by congressional action that directs the President to take a particular action, or bars him from doing so, and by presidential noncompliance. Absent such an irreconcilable conflict, however, many believe it’s unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.

### T

#### We meet – prohibits R2P

#### C/I - “restrictions” can specifically prohibit without effecting all discretion

William M. Hains received his Juris Doctor from the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, in April 2011. He currently serves as a law clerk for the Honorable J. Frederic Voros Jr. on the Utah Court of Appeals, “Challenging the Executive: The Constitutionality of Congressional Regulation of the President's Wartime Detention Policies,” 2011 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 2283

The restrictions on transfers to other countries may present a closer question. The restrictions place significant burdens on the President's ability to negotiate with other countries. The President must demand that the receiving country share intelligence with the United States and, when necessary, take steps to strengthen its detention system. n164 Although the conditions do not explicitly regulate the President's negotiation power, they have that effect: intelligence-sharing and security guarantees must be part of any transfer agreement negotiated by the President. The restrictions also prohibit sending detainees to countries that have had past problems with recidivism, although they give the President some discretion by allowing for a national security exception to this restriction. n165 An examination of presidential and congressional authority over foreign affairs - and negotiations in particular - suggests that the two branches may share concurrent authority over this issue.

#### Prefer our interp –

#### Key to aff creativity – their interp overlimits to 4 affs – makes the resolution stale and kills education

#### No brightline – all of their links still apply

#### The aff doesn’t enforce status quo authority but removes authority the president has

#### Not bidirectional

#### No intent to define

#### Good is good enough – competing interps creates a race to the bottom to find arbitrary interps to limit out the aff – reasonability ensures substantive education

### K

#### We should get to weigh the aff vs a competitive alternative – this is best

#### A Predictability – the rez says USFG so we should predict that’s what the debate is centered around – anything else moots the 1AC and makes fair debate impossible

#### B Education – deliberation about policy proposals is necessary to engage those policies

#### C Plan isn’t tied to larger social and political discourse – we only have to defend its enactment in a vacuum

#### Discourse doesn’t shape state behavior

Mearsheimer 95

John (International Relations professor at the University of Chicago), *The False Promise of International Institutions* in International Security Vol 19 Number 3 Winter, pp 43-44

The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory.155 Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what deter- mines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse- Kappen writes, "Research on. . . 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transna- tional networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selfected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." 156 Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society;" like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] de- prived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" 157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the chal- lenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter- national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159

#### Fetishizing representations fails – it prevents real world change by ignoring how material structures and agency work to create policies

Tuathail, ’96[Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Util is best

David Cummiskey, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Bates College & a Ph.D. from UM, 1996, Kantian Consequentialism, Pg. 145-146

In the next section, I will defend this interpretation of the duty of beneficence. For the sake of argument, however, let us first simply assume that beneficence does not require significant self-sacrifice and see what follows. Although Kant is unclear on this point, we will assume that significant self-sacrifices are supererogatory. Thus, if I must harm one in order to save many, the individual whom I will harm by my action is not morally required to affirm the action. On the other hand, I have a duty to do all that I can for those in need. As a consequence **I am faced with a dilemma: If I act, I harm a person in a way that a rational being need not consent to; if I fail to act, then I do not do my duty to those in need and thereby fail to promote an objective end.** Faced with such a choice, which horn of the dilemma is more consistent with the formula of the end-in-itself? **We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.”** Instead, **the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons.** Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “**to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he [or she] is a separate person, that** ~~his~~ **is the only life he [or she] has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction.** In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? **A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself.”** Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. **If one truly believes that all** rational beings **have an equal value then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many** rational beings **as possible**. **In order to avoid this** conclusion, **the non-consequentialist** Kantian **needs to justify agent-centered constraints.** As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian **deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value based rationale.** But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? **If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity,** that is, **an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value, but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others**. If on focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then **equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many**.

#### Prior questions fail

Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Threats real—default to expert consensus

Knudsen 2001**,** PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn**,** Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this **emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception** of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence or whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur **simultaneously to large numbers of politicians**, and hardly most of the time. During the cold War, threats—in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger—referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which areperceived to be **threatening**. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real—it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard for objective actors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Waever’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic,’ as Waever aptly calls it. Now, here—in the case of urgency—another baby is thrown our with the Waeverian bathwater. When situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with **a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### Focus of the debate should be on the material implications of the plan---discourse doenst spill over

**Ghughunishvili 10**

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

#### Legal restraints work---exception theory is self-serving and wrong

William E. Scheuerman 6, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1

Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: Schmitt occasionally wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal or juridical devices in order then to argue against legal or juridical solutions to them. The claim also suffers from a certain vagueness and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22¶ Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.¶ This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional political and social moment is always doomed to fail. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, the general trend towards extending basic protections to non-state actors is plausibly interpreted in a more positive – and by no means incoherent – light.24¶ Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).¶ As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform the process whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to minimize the danger of anachronistic or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

#### The alt invites worse conflict and violence

Dipert 6 (Randall, PhD, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1291-dipert-preventive-war)

One might think that this principle would give little guidance in recommending anticipatory wars. However, let us suppose that John Rawls, following Raymond Aron and others, is correct in claiming that democratic states (‘liberal constitutional democracies’) have very few except legitimate reasons to go to war, and consequently rarely do go to war for ‘bad’ reasons (Rawls 1999: 47).42 Some wars might still occur because of epistemic mistakes or from (legitimate) mutual fear and distrust trust\*/something Rawls seems not to consider. Let us further suppose that this general level of warfare in a region or in the world gradually decreases in those places where there exist nothing but constitutional democracies. Let us further suppose that democracy can be imposed, or the conditions for democracy can be created, by the correct application of military force. Then there are circumstances in which, if the conditions for the permissibility of preventive of war are met, then preventive war is further recommended by this second principle. There is an interesting question here, beyond philosophical considerations, about whether a nation should formulate and announce policies of exactly what conditions will, and what conditions will not, trigger preventive war. 43 But there is another and telling side of this coin: what if we should have and announce a policy of never engaging in any preemptive or preventive war? Here I think we are encouraging a hostile enemy to prepare an offensive, including weapons development, right up an actual attack. If there do exist, or can possibly exist, truly devastating weapons, this is to invite their development and one’s own annihilation. Even a small nuclear power with ballistic missiles (perhaps positioning missiles on ocean freighters on the high seas) would be free to inflict devastating attacks. While large, stable countries such as China and the former USSR, have historically been deterred by the policy of massive nuclear retaliation, it is unlikely that all nuclear nations with ballistic missiles (including terrorist organizations), will remain deterrable. I believe that such a policy of banning or foreswearing preventive war would almost certainly result in more, rather than fewer, wars and deaths, because it would embolden more state-like entities to believe that they could succeed in an unjust war, especially in ideological wars whose ‘success’ consists simply in inflicting harm on its enemy at all costs.44 To announce a policy of rejecting any preemptive or preventive war is thus almost certainly mistaken and violates my second principle insofar as it increases possible threats. The rare and careful use of restricted preemptive and preventive war, under unspecified conditions, in the world we are likely to have for centuries\*/without, for example, militarily dominant international organizations willing to punish with force the illegitimate use of force\*/is actually likely to make the world more safe. This is not a conclusion that I am especially happy with.45

#### Conditionality bad

### ICJ

#### CP doesn’t solve any of the aff –

#### A. Intervention – Obama discretion fails – it creates a lack of military certainty which ensures ineffective training and operational tempos – that’s Johnson and Vigneat

#### B. Regionalism – Discretion sends the wrong signal – countries think that intervention will still happen – means free riding is inevitable – that’s Bremmer and Carpenter

#### Only Congressional signal Solves

Groves 11 (Steven, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, “Obama Wrongly Adopts U.N. “Responsibility to Protect” to Justify Libya Intervention,” March 31, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/libya-intervention-obama-wrongly-adopts-un-responsibility-to-protect>)

Therefore it would appear that the Obama Administration has adopted both the basic philosophy and the operational characteristics of R2P. This should come as no surprise when the key decision makers regarding Libya included Samantha Power, who authored a Pulitzer Prize-winning book on genocide, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who **promised** during her presidential campaign **to “operationalize”** the **R2P** doctrine and “adopt a policy that recognizes the prevention of mass atrocities as an important national security interest of the United States, not just a humanitarian goal” and “develop a government-wide strategy to support this policy, including a strategy for working with other leading democracies, the United Nations, and regional organizations.”[5] But the Administration should renounce its flirtation with R2P and reject it as its philosophical basis for military intervention. **Adhering to** the **R2P** doctrine **sets a** dangerous precedent. **The more nations** that **appear to follow the doctrine** out of a sense of obligation, **the more** that **the doctrine may be considered to have attained normative status**—**a step towards recognition of R2P as** binding customary international law. If R2P is considered to have attained that status, its principles may be considered obligatory, rather than voluntary. Such an occurrence is likely to constrain U.S. action in the future. Inevitably a time will come when the U.S. will want to intervene in a situation, perhaps to stop an atrocity, only to be criticized for not first receiving authorization from the U.N. Security Council. U.S. strikes against a nation’s leadership in some future intervention may be condemned as “disproportionate” to the humanitarian mission of protecting a civilian population. In short, by adopting the principles of R2P in the Libyan intervention, the President is legitimizing the doctrine and raising the bar for justification for future U.S. military actions. Congress Should Get to the Bottom of This Adopting a doctrine that compels the United States to satisfy a checklist before preventing atrocities occurring in other countries is imprudent. U.S. freedom of action would be compromised if the United States consented to be legally or morally bound by the R2P doctrine. The United States must instead preserve its national sovereignty by maintaining a monopoly over the decision to deploy its military forces. Relevant committees in both houses of Congress should hold hearings to determine the purpose for the U.S. intervention in Libya. This is especially necessary as it appears that the intervention is not winding down but instead has the potential to escalate in the weeks and months ahead. Congress must determine whether this intervention is being pursued for the advancement of U.S. national interests in Libya and the region or to comply with a new “international norm” that was cooked up by a Canadian NGO in 2001 and christened “the responsibility to protect.”

#### Perm do both – Solves the links

#### Object fiat – reject the team – they blur the controversy, warps 2AC time and offense – err aff even if they are “just” TOO CLOSE, practical fairness controls precision on questions of cp theory

#### “Of the President” is an adjective phrase – particularizes “authority”

David Megginson, University of Ottawa, Department of English, 2007. “The Function Of Phrases” writingcentre.uottawa.ca/hypergrammar/phrfunc.html

An adjective phrase is any phrase which modifies a noun or pronoun. You often construct adjective phrases using participles or prepositions together with their objects: I was driven mad by the sound of my neighbour's constant piano practising. In this sentence, the prepositional phrase "of my neighbour's constant piano practising" acts as an adjective modifying the noun "sound."

#### Future Presidents prevent solvency

Friedersdorf, 2013 (Conor, The Atlantic, “Does Obama Really Believe He Can Limit the Next President’s Power?” The Atlantic, May 28, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-obama-really-believe-he-can-limit-the-next-presidents-power/276279/)

Over at Fox News, Chris Wallace and Brit Hume are musing about President Obama's aims on national security. What exactly does he hope to accomplish before leaving office in January 2017? Let's listen in: Chris Wallace: It's been suggested that that's exactly what the president wants to do. He wants to leave a different national-security structure, different rules of the road, different limits, for the next president than what he inherited when he came in. Brit Hume: Not only what he inherited, but what he made generous use of for the purposes of fighting this conflict. There's an odd quality, Chris, to this whole thing. And it its almost like he's saying with regard to the drone policy, 'We need something to stop me before I kill again.' You see that in his support -- on an unrelated matter -- of this shield law for journalists. He's carried out these oversteps in pursuing journalists who are doing their jobs. And now he says, 'We need a shield law,' as if to say, a law to protect them from us. I think it's peculiar. I admit to being a bit puzzled myself, if for slightly different reasons. It's perfectly understandable to serve in a position, appreciate its power, and believe it should be limited by outside constraints, even when they'd constrain you. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson both felt that way at times. If Obama feels that way about a shield law, good for him. And it isn't as if he personally approves every interaction the Department of Justice has with journalists. But something puzzles me about his behavior with regard to the War on Terrorism. It does sometimes appear, as Wallace suggests, that he wants to leave a different national-security structure to his predecessor that limits him or her more than Obama himself was limited in 2009. Administration officials have said as much. A disposition matrix! Strict protocol for putting an American citizen on the kill list! That sort of thing. There was talk, before Election 2012, of Team Obama hurriedly developing changes just in case. So unlike Hume, I don't think it's "stop me before I kill again," so much as, "I trust myself with this power more than anyone. You won't always be so lucky as to have me, but don't worry, I'm leaving instructions." Will anyone follow them? That's what I don't understand. Why does Obama seem to think his successors will constrain themselves within whatever limits he sets? Won't they just set their own limits? Won't those limits be very different? What would Chris Christie do in the White House? I have no idea, but I'm guessing that preserving the decisionmaking framework Obama established isn't what he'd do. Does anyone think Hilary Clinton would preserve it? Obama doesn't seem to realize that his legacy won't be shaped by any perspicacious limits he places on the executive branch, if he ever gets around to placing any on it. The next president can just undo those "self-imposed" limits with the same wave of a hand that Obama uses to create them. His influence in the realm of executive power will be to expand it. By 2016 we'll be four terms deep in major policy decisions being driven by secret memos from the Office of Legal Counsel. The White House will have a kill list, and if the next president wants to add names to it using standards twice as lax as Obama's, he or she can do it, in s0065cret, per his precedent. Some new John Brennan-like figure, with different values and a different personality, will serve as Moral Rectitude Czar. Even ending torture was done by executive order. The folks guilty of perpetrating it weren't punished. Congress wasn't asked to act. (There was an ambitious domestic agenda to focus on!) So who knows what we'll get next, save for a new president who witnessed all the previously unthinkable things post-9/11 presidents got away with so long as they invoked fighting "terror." The fact that every new president is likely to be a power-seeking egomaniac seems like too obvious a flaw in Obama's plan for a smart guy like him not to see it. So what gives? Is all the talk of limiting the executive branch just talk? But why even talk at this point, if so? He isn't running again. Yet if he really does think his office wields too much power, why is he putting in place safeguards the next president can and probably will undo instead of zealously trying to get Congress to act? Yet he does seem to be concerned. Here's Peter Baker reporting in The New York Times: For nearly four years, the president had waged a relentless war from the skies against Al Qaeda and its allies, and he trusted that he had found what he considered a reasonable balance even if his critics did not see it that way. But now, he told his aides, he wanted to institutionalize what in effect had been an ad hoc war, effectively shaping the parameters for years to come "whether he was re-elected or somebody else became president," as one aide said. Ultimately, he would decide to write a new playbook that would scale back the use of drones, target only those who really threatened the United States, eventually get the C.I.A. out of the targeted killing business and, more generally, begin moving the United States past the "perpetual war" it had waged since Sept. 11, 2001. Whether the policy shifts will actually accomplish that remains to be seen, given vague language and compromises forced by internal debate, but they represent an effort to set the rules even after he leaves office. "We've got this technology, and we're not going to be the only ones to use it," said a senior White House official who, like others involved, declined to be identified talking about internal deliberations. "We have to set standards so it doesn't get abused in the future." There's that same obvious flaw, but everyone seems oblivious to it. The standards you're setting? The next president can just change them. In secret, even! That's the problem with extreme executive power: It is capricious, prone to abuse, and difficult to meaningfully check. Does Obama think the next man or woman will just behold the wisdom of his approach and embrace it? That error, unthinkable as it seems, would not be without precedent for this president.

#### No great power war – cooperation in the international arena

#### No Impact – tensions won’t escalate

Chaibi 3/4/13 – 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, “The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea”, <http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/>, CMR)

**What** then **is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation**? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), **the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence** of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. **The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration**. $**5.3 trillion of trade,** of which approximately 20% is US, **transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would** also **very likely guarantee US military intervention**[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. **Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009,** and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security.¶ Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. **Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation**. **Chinese President** Hu **Jintao**’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly **expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas**”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea).¶ The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi].¶ **The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability**. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that **the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo.** Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and **China has frequently shown restraint in this regard** (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

#### Diplomacy fails – only regionalism solves conflict

Michael J. Mazarr, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College, "The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 35 n. 4, Fall 2012, p. 14-15.

Diplomacy increasingly fails. A parallel risk has to do with the ebbing force of U.S. diplomacy and influence. International power is grounded in legitimacy, and in many ways it is precisely the legitimacy of the leading power’s global posture that is under assault as its posture comes into question. Historically, rising challengers gradually stop respecting the hegemon’s right to lead, and they begin to make choices on behalf of the international community, in part due to strategies consciously designed to frustrate the leading power’s designs. Germany, under Bismarck and after, is one example: It aspired to unification and to its ‘‘rightful place’’ as a leading European power as its power and influence accumulated, its willingness to accept the inherent legitimacy of the existing order as defined by other states, and the validity and force of their security paradigms, declined proportionately. At nearly all points in this trajectory, German leaders did not seek to depose the international system, but to crowd into its leadership ranks, to mute the voices of others relative to its own influence, and to modify rather than abolish rules.¶ We begin to see this pattern today with regard to many emerging powers, but especially of course, China’s posture toward the United States.31 As was predicted and expected in the post-Cold War context of growing regional power centers, the legitimacy of a system dominated by the United States is coming under increasing challenge. More states (and, increasingly, non-state actors) want to share in setting rules and norms and dictating outcomes.¶ The obvious and inevitable result has been to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. While measuring the relative success of a major power’s diplomacy over time is a chancy business (and while Washington continues to have success on many fronts), the current trajectory is producing a global system much less subject to the power of U.S. diplomacy and other forms of influence. Harvard’s Stephen Walt catalogues the enormous strengths of the U.S. position during and after the Cold War, and compares that to recent evidence of the emerging limits of U.S. power. Such evidence includes Turkey’s unwillingness to support U.S. deployments in Iraq, the failure to impose U.S. will or order in Iraq or Afghanistan, failures of nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, the Arab Spring’s challenges to long-standing U.S. client rulers, and more.32 As emerging powers become more focused on their own interests and goals, their domestic dynamics will become ever more self-directed and less subject to manipulation from Washington, a trend evident in a number of major recent elections.¶ Washington will still enjoy substantial influence, and many states will welcome (openly or grudgingly) a U.S. leadership role. But without revising the U.S. posture, the gap between U.S. ambitions and capabilities will only grow. Continually trying to do too much will create more risk of demands unmet, requests unfulfilled, and a growing sense of the absurdity of the U.S. posture. Such a course risks crisis and conflict. Similarly, doubt in the threats and promises underpinning an unviable U.S. security posture risks conflict: U.S. officials will press into situations assuming that their diplomacy will be capable of achieving certain outcomes and will make demands and lay out ultimatums on that basis only to find that their influence cannot achieve the desired goals, and they must escalate to harsher measures. The alternative is to shift to a lesser role with more limited ambitions and more sustainable legitimacy.

### Politics

**No global economic collapse and it wouldn’t cause conflict**

**Drezner 2011**

(Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 8-12-2011, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers,” Foreign polivy, <http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/>, CMR)

So, **when we last left off** this debate, **things were looking grim**. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. **Let's assume** that **the global economy persists in sputtering for a while**, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. **Why won't** these other **bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931?** Let's start with the obvious -- **it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out**. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. **The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system.** In terms of publuc attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below: 2007 poll results 2010 poll results The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, **support for free markets has increased in other major powers**, such as Germany and China. On the whole, **despite the worst global economic crisis** since the Great Depression, **public attitudes have not changed all that much**. **While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky** or anything so drastc. Another big difference is that **multilateral economic institutions are much more robust** now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of **the W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization**'s** **corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are** still **working quite well.** Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. **The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis**. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo. As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that **the G-20's most useful function is reassurance**. Even if there are disagreements, **communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse.** Finally, **a note about the possibility of riots and** other **general social unrest.** **The working paper** cited in my previous post **noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances**. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19**: [I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower**. **Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant**. **As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines**. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant. This is good news!! **The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931**. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule. So yes, **the recent economic news might seem grim**. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, **however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the** 19**30's**. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.

#### NSA thumps – huge political fight and a loss on authority

Cohen 3-25 (Tom, “Obama, Congress working on changes to NSA,” <http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/25/politics/white-house-nsa/>)

President Barack Obama and congressional leaders described similar proposals Tuesday for ending the National Security Agency's sweeping collection of bulk telephone records. Obama told reporters in The Netherlands that his intelligence team gave him a "workable" option for NSA reform that he said would "eliminate " concerns about how the government keeps the records known as metadata. At a news conference in Washington, the leaders of the House Intelligence Committee said they worked out their own bipartisan compromise on a similar proposal intended to alleviate what they characterized as unfounded fears of excessive government surveillance. The nearly simultaneous remarks demonstrated progress toward Obama's call in January for NSA changes in the aftermath of last year's classified leaks by former agency contractor Edward Snowden that revealed the magnitude of surveillance programs created in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Congressional battle coming However, the issue touches on deep political and ideological fissures between Republicans and Democrats, promising an extended battle in Congress over the necessary legislation -- especially in an election year. A senior administration official told CNN that the White House plan, first reported by The New York Times, would ensure "the government no longer collects or holds" the telephone metadata -- records that include the numbers and time of calls, but no content such as the actual conversation. According to the official, the proposal "still ensures that the government has access to the information it needs" for national security purposes. The official declined to specify where the bulk phone metadata would ultimately be stored. Now it is collected by the NSA under broad legal authority to keep it for five years. It was not immediately clear how the White House proposal differed from the compromise announced by Reps. Mike Rogers of Michigan and Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland -- the top Republican and Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. Their plan would end the automatic NSA collection of phone metadata, with telecommunications companies keeping such records for at least 18 months -- as they do now. Court approval Two layers of court approval would be needed to access the records -- one for the overall surveillance program seeking the information, and another for the specific foreign phone number being investigated, the legislators said. The Snowden leaks unleashed a political firestorm, with privacy advocates and others calling the NSA surveillance programs a violation of constitutional rights. In particular, many Americans feared inevitable abuse of a system in which the government collected billions of phone records for possible review in terrorism investigations. Snowden, now living in Russia while seeking asylum from U.S. prosecution, has repeatedly described the surveillance programs illuminated by his leaks as unconstitutional. Several legal challenges have been mounted against the NSA programs, and some of those cases could reach the Supreme Court in coming years to set up a judicial review of the constitutional limits of government surveillance in the post 9/11 era. Obama and the two House legislators all said Tuesday the current system was legal, but needed changing to reassure a skeptical public Obama: "People were concerned" In The Hague, Obama argued that "clear safeguards" exist against "some of the dangers that people hypothesize when it came to bulk data." "But I recognize that people were concerned about what might happen in the future with that bulk data," he said. "This proposal that's been presented to me would eliminate that concern." Rogers argued no abuses occurred under the present system, but he acknowledged public concern about the possibility of problems down the road if the government kept such vast stores of information. "That's really what we're trying to do here is alleviate that concern that there could be abuse in the future of these programs," he said. Authorization for the current NSA programs expires on Friday, and Obama will seek a temporary renewal until Congress passes reform legislation, the senior administration official said. News of the proposed changes came during Obama's trip to Europe, where he's mobilizing support for isolating Russia over its military occupation and annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Snowden's leaks put the NSA's surveillance activities under global scrutiny. The revelations included U.S. spying on European allies and others, sparking diplomatic protests. Nine months of negotiations In January, Obama outlined a series of steps -- some immediate and some requiring time to work out, possibly with Congress -- that would change aspects of the NSA collection of phone records and other information but generally leave intact the core and function of existing programs. Rogers and Ruppersberger said Tuesday that nine months of negotiations involving the intelligence community and other stakeholders led to their proposed legislation. The White House was involved in the discussions, Ruppersberger said, while Rogers noted the Obama proposal came out after the committee shared its plan with the White House earlier this week. He noted that more work remains to be done to narrow differences with the White House and the Senate. "We're feeling pretty good about people starting to coalesce around a solution," Rogers said, adding that "there will be people who are married to their own positions." Initial reaction to the White House plan included praise with some caution. Step forward Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon, a leading critic of the NSA surveillance programs, said news of the White House plan amounted to an executive branch retreat. "For years, the executive branch said it was essential to have this information, that it was indispensable," Wyden said, noting he and colleagues argued against that notion. "Today's exciting news for the constitutional rights of the American people is the administration said they agree with us." Michelle Richardson, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, called the reported White House plan "a crucial first step towards reining in the NSA's overreaching surveillance." "The change would replace the dragnet surveillance of millions of innocent people with targeted methods that are both effective and respect Americans' constitutional rights," Richardson said, adding: "It is critical that the administration also end other bulk collection programs."

#### Ukraine overshadows everything

Justin Sink, the Hill, 3/20/14, Obama’s bully pulpit struggle, thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/russia/201333-obamas-bully-pulpit-struggle

President Obama’s reliance on the bully pulpit to bump up ObamaCare’s enrollment and hammer Republicans in an election year is facing a serious challenge with the crisis in Ukraine. The worst U.S.-Russia crisis since the Cold War is taking up a significant amount of the administration’s oxygen, complicating the president's efforts to get his message out. On Thursday, Obama sought to put the spotlight on higher pay for women, an election-year issue Democrats believe they can turn to their advantage in November. But his event in Orlando was largely overshadowed by his announcement earlier in the day of new sanctions on Moscow, part of a showdown with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The administration isn’t giving up its efforts even as Obama seeks to contain Russia, and the cross-currents have led to some odd juxtapositions. On Thursday, the day began with the release of a video of Obama joking with talk-show host Ellen DeGeneres over her selfie at the Oscars, which broke Obama’s record for re-tweets. Obama’s appearance on “Ellen” was meant to promote the healthcare law. Hours later, a somber Obama announced new sanctions on Russia on the White House South Lawn, with the Marine One helicopter as his background shot. As Obama was speaking, ESPN Radio’s “The Herd with Colin Cowherd” was airing a previously taped interview with the president in which he dug into his March Madness bracket. In the interview, Obama also defended his appearance with comedian Zach Galifianakis on his “Between two Ferns” Web series, noting Abraham Lincoln famously loved to tell “bawdy jokes.” The hubbub over that video, released last Tuesday, drowned out a White House event with female lawmakers designed to highlight the president’s election-year focus on women’s issues. Still later on Thursday, Obama used the event at Valencia College in Florida to scold Republicans for opposing the Paycheck Fairness Act. The commander in chief was replaced by the campaigner in chief, who called on the GOP to “join us in this century” and pass the legislation meant to ensure women receive equal pay for equal work. Obama also called on lawmakers to raise the minimum wage. After concluding his remarks, Obama was rushed back to Air Force One for a short trip to Miami, where he plans to attend a fundraiser Thursday night at the home of former Miami Heat star Alonzo Mourning. None of this is wildly out of order for a modern presidency in which the leader of the free world must balance state dinners with appearances on “The Tonight Show.” But recent events have provided an extreme example of the tightrope Obama must walk.

#### Obama already getting hammered – he’s a loser

- ACA attacks

- foreign policy – Russia, Syria, Iran, Israel

- exec nominees

- GOP obstructionism

Linker 3-25 (Damon, “Why Barack Obama is the biggest obstacle to a Hillary Clinton presidency,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/258612/why-barack-obama-is-the-biggest-obstacle-to-a-hillary-clinton-presidency>)

Barack Obama’s approval ratings are mired in the low 40s. The signature legislative achievement of his presidency, the Affordable Care Act, remains extremely unpopular — so much so that the administration keeps putting off implementation of key parts of the law (a move that may well be unconstitutional). When it comes to foreign policy, the U.S. looks bewildered and ineffective in some areas (Russia, Syria) and setting itself up for humiliation in others (Iran, Israel-Palestine). And then there’s Congress. Obama has already given up on trying to move legislation through the Republican-controlled House. And in the past few months, he hasn’t even been able to get his executive branch nominees through the Senate, where Democrats in the majority have gone so far as to implement a controversial rule change to block filibusters of most nominations. What’s likely to happen if the Republicans take the Senate in November? Answer: nothing. Meaning that for the last two years of Obama’s presidency, nothing whatsoever will make it through Congress. Republicans will do everything in their power to turn Obama into the lamest lame-duck president in history. And though it may not be fair, that ineffectiveness is likely to drive down Obama’s poll numbers even further.

**War power losses won’t affect immigration or PC**

Perry **Bacon 9/9**/13, “Losing the Syria vote does not turn Obama into a lame duck”, <http://thegrio.com/2013/09/09/no-losing-the-syria-vote-does-not-turn-obama-into-a-lame-duck/>, CMR

McDonough ducked the question, preferring to focus on the substance of the administration’s case for military action. But to be clear, **no**, **Obama losing** a vote on Syria **does not turn him into a lame duck**.¶ Would the defeat be bad for the president? Of course. Polls show majorities of not only conservatives, who oppose much of what Obama does on every issue, but also liberals and moderates disagree with the president on intervening in Syria. If a vote gets to the House of Representatives, there’s a chance it will be defeated with large blocs of liberals and black members of Congress voting against a president who they have strongly supported for much of the last five years. The White House would have made an all-out blitz to win the support of American voters and Congress and lost.¶ A defeat would show Obama’s words on chemical weapons and perhaps other foreign policy ideas won’t be supported by deeds. It would also illustrate Americans are even more wary of intervention in other nations than was generally believed and likely block Obama from any kind of military action in the future, even the kind of limited steps he took in Libya two years ago.¶ But **the presidency is not one issue, or just about foreign policy**. **If the House or** the **Senate** **blocks** action in **Syria, Republicans still would be wise to back** the **immigration** bill the Senate passed earlier this year, giving Obama a major victory but also making it easier for the GOP to win Latino votes in the future. **House Republicans**, **divided** **internally on that issue**, **have been delaying consideration** of the bill, and **that process is unaffected by what happens on Syria**.¶ The **Obama** administration, **even if it does not act in Syria, will still be implementing** a far-reaching **health care** law that could provide health insurance to millions of Americans. The president will still have the use of the bully pulpit, to make the case against America’s growing income inequality and urge our society to focus more on the specific challenges faced by African-American males, as Obama suggested he would do after the George Zimmerman verdict. **The administration can still fight** controversial voting laws passed in Republican-led states, urge fewer prosecutions of non-violent drug offenders and support the growing American acceptance of gay marriage.¶ And it wasn’t as if Obama’s agenda had been moving quickly through Congress before he starting talking about Syria. Republicans in the Senate had blocked his gun control push, the House delayed the immigration bill and members of both parties were not fully on board with his economic agenda. Before Syria was in the headlines, the administration was planning to spend September pushing for Congress to approve government funding for the next year and raise the federal debt limit, the kind of necessary but unexciting lawmaking that Obama has been limited to since Republicans won control of the House of Representatives in 2010.¶ That’s **the key factor here: Republican control of the House**. **Much speculation has centered on Obama losing his “political capital”** or his ability to influence Congress and the public over the last three years. But **the evidence is fairly clear; Obama has struggled to get legislation through Congress since its membership came to include many more Republicans**, who disagree with him on most issues. If Obama wanted to cut taxes on the wealthy Americans or allow the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, both ideas Republicans strongly support, they could easily be passed in Congress.¶ **A loss by Obama** on Syria **won’t change the views of Republicans, who were already against most of what Obama proposed, or congressional Democrats, who won’t suddenly stop supporting** Obamacare or **other presidential initiatives**.¶ **If the president is barred** from attacking Syria by Congress, **that will not be the last real day of his presidency.** The next day will not be the first day of the 2016 campaign, which has long been underway anyway. President George W. **Bush’s poll numbers dropped** quickly **after** his **mishandling** of the aftermath of Hurricane **Katrina**, and **it was considered the end of presidency. But he still managed to implement** a whole **new strategy in Iraq and** **loan billions** of taxpayer dollars **to American banks and auto companies** in his last two years in office — **hardly** the stuff of **a man who was powerless**.¶ **No matter what happens** in Syria, Barack **Obama will still have** more than 1200 days to make **an impact** on American public policy and culture.

**Not intrinsic – do the plan and pass immigration reform**

**Fiat solves the link — it’s instant — no political effect – most logical because congress is the agent of the resolution this year**

**---Plan splits the GOP**

**Corn 13** – David Corn, Reporter at Mother Jones, "Obama, Syria, and Congress: Why Did He Go There?", Mother Jones, 9-6, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/09/why-obama-sought-congressional-authorization-syria>, CMR

**With his decision to seek congressional approval** for an attack, **Obama created a political whirlpool**. **He exacerbated the growing schism on the right that pits tea party isolationists**—led by possible presidential candidate Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), with Sens. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), other likely 2016ers, rushing to catch up—**versus** the coalition of **hawks** commanded by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and neocons who yearn for a deeper and larger intervention in Syria than the president envisions. **This** split **has the potential to turn into an ideological civil war within the GOP** during the next presidential campaign. Meanwhile, **House Republicans are deeply divided** (unlike during the run-up to the Iraq war), with Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and his leadership crew on the president's side and rank-and-file House GOPers, enwrapped in Obama hatred, accusing the president of misleading the world and engaging in conspiratorial warmongering.

**---Key to the agenda**

**Dickerson 13** (John, Slate, Go for the Throat21, 1/18, [www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html), CMR)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. **Gridlock** over the fiscal cliff **preceded** it and **gridlock** over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, **the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that** the president's **clashes with** House Republicans **will end soon**. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. **The challenge for** President **Obama’s** speech is the challenge of his **second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires** something **more than** simply the clever application of **predictable stratagems**. Washington’s **partisan rancor**, the size of the problems facing government, **and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president** who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation **can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP**. If he wants to transform American politics, **he must go for the throat**. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack **Obama** of the first administration **might have approached the task by finding** some **Republicans to deal with and** then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would **win some of their votes**. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. **That's the old way. He has abandoned that.** **He doesn't think it will work** and **he doesn't have the time.** As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the **Republicans are dead set on opposing him**. **They cannot be unchained by schmoozing**. **Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation**. **Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges** in 2014 **are not going to be willing partners.** He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. **Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize**. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. **Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to** either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or **cause a rift in the party that will leave it**, at least temporarily, **in disarray**.